

Are we constructing a semantics for a language that is supposed to fill some specific role? Are we describing how natural languages work? Or is the role of philosophy of language to see how much of natural language we can reductively describe by using the tools invented for constructing a semantics of an artificial language? A clarification of what the task of philosophy of language is, is long overdue. Hopefully this is a subject I will be able to work with on a later occasion.

To avoid disappearing in to a discussion about the role of philosophy of language I have chosen to show the potential of a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical questions by looking at how he could handle the philosophically laden yet naïve questions of a philosophical layman. I have chosen to in the following work with two such questions. I believe questions of this kind are questions both Wittgenstein and his adversaries will think of as questions deserving philosophical examination. I thus hope to be able to exemplify the potential of a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophical questions while avoiding to have to say anything about what the ‘ultimate goal of philosophy’ is. Questions as these are also of particular interest from a Wittgensteinian point of view since Wittgenstein believed that philosophical confusion starts with asking just those naïve yet confused questions.

To make the discussion easier I have chosen to formulate both of the naïve yet philosophically laden questions on the background of a passage from the book “The city of the red cloak” by the Turkish writer Asli Erdogan. The story of the book takes place in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The main character is walking on a usually busy street that is empty because everybody is watching the football match between Brazil and Russia. Then, in the pouring rain, she sees a homeless person lying across a small pond on the sidewalk outside the movie theatre Cinelandia. To say that life has not been kind to him would be a cruel understatement. He is starved and is struggling to reach over to his vomit, looking for pieces he can eat. The narrating main character then writes:

I have to tell about a man I encountered over by Cinelandia half an hour before the Russia – Brazil match, at a specific point in time and place; I have to tell it to everybody, whether they want to listen or not. I have to pay for the scream that stuck in my throat. (...)

However, now that I look at the letters I have lined up, on the white emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him. I am not strong enough, cruel and merciful enough. I haven’t starved enough. Words cannot give him his life

back, but they can at least re-establish his name: He was a Human.⁷⁶

This passage could be interpreted and analysed in several ways, but I will concentrate on one. The first aspect I want to emphasise is that the author says that she “lacks a language” in which to express her experience. She is unable to find words that cover what she wants to communicate. The idea I want to pursue is that we sometimes blame the lack of appropriate words for our inability to psychologically cope with a situation. I find the passage above as a good example of that, although other interpretations of course are possible.⁷⁷

The first naïve yet philosophically inclined question I want to ask is: “*Why can’t we just make up a word to cover the emotion we want to express? Couldn’t our desperate need to express ourselves be satisfied if we just ostensibly baptize the emotion we have no word for, and thus have a word to express it with?*” The second aspect the philosophical layman might want to emphasise is that, even if the author *had* been able to express *her* impression perfectly, we readers would still not have the *same* emotion after having read it as the author had when she wrote it. The philosophically inclined layman might put the point bluntly by saying that: “*We cannot link into each others minds and communicate our experiences directly*”. This truth could, and has been, expressed as “only I know what I feel”. The layman might agree and add: “*But how is it then, that we are able to communicate emotions at all?*”

Wittgenstein, beyond doubt, believes that these simple questions already have taken us a few steps down the path of confusion. We should therefore not attempt to answer the questions as they stand. We will in the following look at how understanding Wittgenstein

⁷⁶ Erdogan, Asli. *Byen med den røde kappa*. Translated from Turkish by Gunvald Ims. Oslo: Gyldendal, 2004. Pages 139-140.

The book has not been translated to English and I have therefore translated the text from Norwegian to English. I am grateful to the Norwegian translator of the book, Gunvald Ims, for making important adjustments to the translation. The Norwegian translation reads: “Jeg er nødt til å fortelle om denne mannen som jeg kom over ved Cinelandia en halvtime før Russland-Brasil kampen, altså på et bestemt tidspunkt i tid og rom; jeg må fortelle det til alle, om de vil høre på eller ikke. Jeg må betale noe som veier opp for det skriket som satte seg fast i halsen. (...) Men nå, når jeg ser på bokstavene jeg har stilt opp på det tomme, hvite papiret, får jeg ikke øye på han. Jeg mangler fortsatt språket til å fortelle om han. Jeg er ikke sterk, grusom og barmhjertig nok. Jeg har ikke sulta nok. Ord kan ikke gi han livet tilbake, men kan i det minste gi han et navn: Han var et Menneske.”

⁷⁷ I understand the sentences “I am not strong enough, cruel and merciful enough. I haven’t starved enough.” as indicating, not that having some particular experience would put her in a position where she could communicate, but as indicating the psychological shock of a middle-class woman encountering such a brutal example of poverty.

can change the motivation behind questions such as these. We will respect the philosophical layman's craving for a satisfaction of his inquisitiveness, while still not answering the questions with the kind of answer he would expect. A kind answer for example of Wright would give him.

I will in the following focus only on two topics Wittgenstein discusses that are relevant for the two questions above: the first is how we learn new words and the second is how the first person/third person asymmetry of words for emotions is rooted in their grammar. ('Grammar' in Wittgenstein's sense.) That is not to say that what follows is an exhaustive commentary on everything Wittgenstein has to say about the subject of words for emotions. Topics that are obviously relevant like the inner/outer distinction, the private language argument, colour words, etc., are left out or only treated indirectly. This is an *exemplification* of how a Wittgensteinian outlook on philosophy is both productive and useful; an exemplification taking words for emotions as a subject.

How we learn new words

Discussing how we learn new words will cast light on the topic of words for emotions for two reasons. Firstly, it provides an example of how Wittgenstein's style is connected to his overall point in PI. That, according to Wittgenstein, language is a bundle of phenomena and giving one analysis of all language is not possible. What is similar for all those phenomena we call language is, firstly, that it has been invented by us humans and, secondly, that it is closely interwoven with our customs and practices.

The second reason that how we learn words is interesting for understanding words for emotions is that learning a new word seems to be the thing we want to when we try to express an unfamiliar emotion.

This section relies heavily on chapter seven, "Excursus on Wittgenstein's vision of language", of Stanley Cavell's book "The claim of reason".

Pointing and naming

The backdrop of Cavell's discussion is the Augustinian picture of language that Wittgenstein describes in the first paragraphs of PI. For Augustine, learning one's mother tongue is not all that different from learning a foreign language. You see something you

want to say something about, point it out and ask for its name.⁷⁸ If we, with this picture as our background, try to answer the first naïve yet philosophical question above, we immediately run into trouble.

First of all we need to ask if it is possible to just name an emotion something. Could we see it happening in real life? The common sense answer to this is yes. I believe Wittgenstein would answer yes too. What Wittgenstein attacks in the Private Language Argument is not the idea that we *could* name some hitherto un-named emotion, but the idea that what *really* happens is that we connect the stream of sounds with an mental state by way of making a rule about it. For the philosophical layman, it is the *inclination* towards thinking about language as this kind of rule-following that is the first step towards confusion.

The second step is the idea that it is a *lack of appropriate words* that prompts the author to write: “I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him”. If all we do when we learn a word is point to something and connect what we point to with a stream of sounds, then would the author feel she *has* expressed her experience in a satisfactory way? Above I said that Wittgenstein *could* save that we can invent names for our emotions, but now I have to qualify that. It is possible to come up with names for till now un-experienced emotions, but is it coming up with and *name* that (usually) gives us emotional peace? So yes, we can find a name for an emotion, but blaming a “lack of language in which to express something” will usually be a linguistic camouflage for some other psychological need.

From what the author says about “not having starved enough”, etc., it seems quite obvious that she would not be satisfied with simply making some stream of sounds a symbol for a past experience. What is interesting here is not primarily whether inventing a new word would communicate what the author wants to say to her readers, but if she herself would feel satisfied with the new word. Would she, which writes: “However, now that I look at the letters I have lined up, on the white emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him.”, feel that, as she now has

⁷⁸ When I write about “Augustine’s view of language” I keep to Wittgenstein’s exposition of him. I am aware that an apology for Augustine is possible to make, but the views of the philosopher Augustine’s are not what is at stake here.

ostensively baptized the emotion, she finally has a “language in which to tell about him”? Would she feel she has expressed her desperation if she just decides to name the hitherto inexpressible emotion, for example with the following random juxtaposition of letters, ‘compa’? Of course not. So Wittgenstein could say that we can name any emotion whatever we want, but that such a baptism might not give us the benefits we thought it would give. One of the result of the process the author has to go through to be able to deal with her experience might be that she finds a word that describes the situation, but that word would not do the same “psychological work” for someone who has not gone through that process.

The first vaccination against the pointing and naming idea of language is that we need to “...reconsider the obvious fact that there is not the *clear* difference between learning and maturation that we sometimes suppose there is.”⁷⁹ For example, there are certain things that need to be in place *before* we can start learning words.⁸⁰ These things we are *taught*. When we as infants learn the word ‘food’ we thereby do not know what all types of things are foods. And that some food is liquid, but not everything that is liquid that we put in the mouth is food, that some food must be cut, etc. The word ‘food’ is part of a whole system of practices and words. When we learn a second language we do not need to learn more than what the equivalent for ‘food’ is in that other language to be able to use it. But when we learn it for the first time we have to learn not only what food *means* but also what food *is*. Augustine assumes too much when he believes that all we need is the labels for the categories ‘we already have’.

Augustine makes this mistake because he, probably amongst other things, assumes that language is *one* thing. Had it been, it would have made sense to look for one or a few mechanisms by which we make new words. For example by ostensive definitions. Having realised that language is not one unified phenomena, but a bundle of phenomena, a search for *the* mechanism for making new words is no longer natural. We learn language in just as many different ways as there are different parts of language, so we should learn to appreciate and study the diversity rather than trying to find the common denominator. A few examples might make this less cryptic.

⁷⁹ Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 171.

⁸⁰ See for example §32.

When a child for the first time sees a horse its father will probably point at it and say “Horse! Horse! See the Horse. That’s a biiiig horse.” If the child then smiles and says ‘horse’, or something that sound a bit like it, has it then attached a mental label to the visual impression of it? When an infant cries out something that sounds like ‘mama’ for the first time it is not because it already knows the word. It is because it is any easy sound combination to make. If the mother then looks into the eyes of the baby and smiles and repeats ‘mama, mama’ while pointing at herself, does it suddenly dawn on the infant that it now knows the label for that person that is smiling at her? When a father takes his son to a football game for the first time and screams at the referee and throws popcorn at the field, is he then teaching his son alternative labels for a referee?

Wittgenstein says we learn language by being initiated into practices. The father at the football game is *influencing* his son into becoming a football supporter by *displaying* a way of being. Learning is not the isolated intellectual process that many philosophers seem to tacitly suppose. Learning a language is a complex process involving the culture, the body with its necessities and limitations, the age of a person, our relation to those that teach it to us, what we like and dislike, and so on practically ad infinitum. If we look at how language works it is clear for everybody to see how little of language is attaching labels to things.⁸¹ Cavell summarizes the point beautifully:

In “learning language” you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, but what expressing a wish is; not merely what the word for “father” is, but what a father is; nor merely what the word for “love” is, but what love is. In learning language, you do not merely learn the pronunciation of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the “forms of life” which make those sounds the words they are, do what they do – e.g., name, call, point, express a wish or affection, indicate a choice or an aversion, etc.⁸²

An interesting corroboration of this view can be found in the writings of the psychologist L. S. Vygotsky (1896-1934). Under the heading “Internalization of higher psychological functions” he says that:

A good example of this process [of internalization] may be found in the development of pointing. Initially, this gesture is nothing more than an

⁸¹ Cavell page 174: “But what I take Wittgenstein to be suggesting is: Take the label analogy seriously; and then you’ll see how little of language is like that.”

⁸² Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 177-178.

unsuccessful attempt to grasp something, (...). (...) When the mother comes to the child's aid and realizes his movement indicates something, the situation changes fundamentally. Pointing becomes a gesture for others. The child's unsuccessful attempt engenders a reaction not from the object he seeks but from another person. (...) At this juncture there occurs a change in that movement's function: from an object-oriented movement it becomes a movement aimed at another person, a means of establishing a relations. The grasping movement changes to the act of pointing. (...) Its meaning and functions are created at first by an objective situation and then by people who surround the child.⁸³

What Vygotsky calls "internalization of higher psychological functions" seems to be parallel to what Wittgenstein calls "being initiated into a practice". If nothing else, the comparison helps bring to light a misconception of Wittgenstein's concept of 'practice': that practices, like customs, are things we can reject or accept on the basis of personal preferences. In the quote from Vygotsky it is obvious that an "internalization of a higher psychological function" is not something we can decide whether or not to act on, because we are talking of the *formation* of mind, not just of its instantiations in the activities anthropology describes.

When I take the quote from Vygotsky as a corroboration of Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, it is because I believe that showing that language is not learned primarily by ostensive definitions is a *strong indication* that the language of an adult is as tightly knit to practices as when it is learnt. It is only less obvious. There is little doubt that Wittgenstein, from an exegetical point of view, sees this as a strong reason for rejecting the view that words can be analysed independently of these practices. Only because 'mama' can be symbolized by the four letters "m a m a" does not mean that the word mama can be broken down and analyzed in non-"mama-practice" terms.⁸⁴

Extending the use of a word already there

Seeing language as a complex jumble of words with different origins not only means we have a different picture of how language came into being, but we also have a different

⁸³ Page 56 of: Vygotsky, L. S. *Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes*. Edited by Cole, Michael, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner and Ellen Souberman. Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London: Harvard University Press, 1978.

⁸⁴ The arguments of this paragraph obviously need to quite a lot of fleshing out. This is something I hope to do on a later occasion. Although I am not as convinced of the argument as Wittgenstein seems to be, I believe it is a train of thought worth pursuing.. See also the footnote in the section of "Craving generalised officers" concerning Cappelen and Lepore.

picture of how language evolves. Much of our language use involves classifying new phenomena into the categories we already have. On the Augustinian picture this would mean something like finding a good category for a phenomenon or inventing a new category for it. On the Cavellian reading of Wittgenstein the situation is more complex. His view is best illustrated by an example.

Cavell asks us to think about how we use the word ‘to feed’.⁸⁵ When we feed a dog we either put something edible in its tray or give it some snack directly from the hand. When we feed a baby we use a spoon. We also feed a slot machine when we insert coins into it. And we feed the monkeys at the zoo when we throw peanuts into their cage. We might also say that we are feeding the family when someone asks us why we do not quit a boring job. All these examples use the word ‘feed’ but finding one thing common to them all would be hard. We could say that we both ‘feed’ the monkeys and the baby because we give them something to eat. But that excludes ‘feeding’ the slot machine. Likewise, throwing peanuts at a baby would not be ‘feeding’ it, neither would stuffing coins in the mouth of a dog. The key to understanding how language actually is, is that there is a family resemblance (see §§66 and 67) between all these instances of ‘feed’. Once we have been initiated into a practice involving certain words we continuously apply the words we know to new instances that are similar in *some* respects. In Cavell’s words:

I am trying to bring out, and keep in balance, two fundamental facts about human forms of life, and about the concepts formed in those forms: that any form of life and every concept integral to it have an indefinite number of instances and directions of projection; and that this variation is not arbitrary.

...to say that a word or concept has a (stable) meaning is to say that new and the most various instances can be recognized as falling under or failing to fall under that concept...⁸⁶

Instead of saying that the diversity of language and heavy reliance on family resemblance is something we can explain *after* we have made an analysis of the core of language, like Augustine might say, Wittgenstein’s puts diversity at the centre of his conception of language. Whether the new use of a word is recognized as falling under or failing to fall under that concept cannot be established by a semantic analysis (alone), but only from

⁸⁵ Cavell, “The claim of reason”, 181.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 185.

inside those practices, i.e. by a person who has the language in question as to her mother tongue. This is what happens in §200 where Wittgenstein asks us if we would call it playing chess to ‘dance along the rules of chess’.⁸⁷

Rejecting the ostensive definitions model has consequences for how we look at naming emotions. Writing poems and books, making movies, painting, composing is not simply a matter of *naming* emotions. Learning the name of an emotion is a discovery we make when we learn more about ourselves. Finding ways of expressing emotions is not separate from maturing emotionally and making more fine-grained distinction in our emotional lives. Naming a new emotion is not just a matter of attaching a label, but of going through a process - a process which will be different for different kinds of words. A process, moreover, which will include our personal history, our cultural surroundings, the framework of the human biology, etc.

In the quote from Asli Erdogan’s novel the narrating main-character said that:

However, now that I look at the letters I have lined up, on the white emptiness in front of me, I cannot see that man. I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him. I am not strong enough, cruel and merciful enough. I haven’t starved enough. Words cannot give him his life back, but they can at least re-establish his name: He was a Human.

The sentence “I am still in lack of a language in which to tell about him.” lends itself towards interpreting her problem as being that it is the language as such that does not ‘accommodate’ her experience. On this background I suggested that a philosophically inclined layman might ask something like: “*Why can’t we just make up a word to cover the emotion we want to express? Couldn’t our desperate need to express ourselves be satisfied if we just ostensibly baptize the emotion we have no words, and thus have a word to express it with?*”

The first point about this is that a Wittgensteinian response to the philosophically inclined layman is that, just because the main-character says that she “lacks a language in which to tell about him” does not mean that that is the real ‘problem’ here. Our language can sometimes confuse us and make us look for answers in the wrong place. In the example above the wording makes it seem like (on at least one interpretation) a ‘better’ *language*,

⁸⁷ See pages 41-42 for a discussion of §200.

or at least a different language, might remedy the acute need for expressing the experience.

The second point is that what is needed in the narrator's case is not some word that will make everything fall into place. What is needed is an emotional and psychological maturation process.

Adherents of views on language that Wittgenstein would oppose will of course not deny that a maturation process is essential when naming emotions. Wittgenstein would probably argue that they cannot have their cake and eat it. They cannot insist on analysing language by reduction to non-normative terms and still claim they want to leave the diversity of language untouched. But this is one of the topics I wanted to avoid by leaving for some other occasion to discuss what the role of philosophy of language is.

What I hope to illustrate is that we from a Wittgensteinian view on language can make a contribution to the understanding of different phenomena of language. What for some seems like a stern outlook on the possibility of doing philosophy is the exact opposite: an opportunity for a fresh outlook and a productive examination of the world we live in. Wittgenstein is not only talking about language as an assemblage of words but "about the entire body and spirit of human conduct and feeling which goes into the capacity for speech".⁸⁸ That leaves us with a lot more, not a lot less, to study.

The grammar of words for and words for emotions

We have now looked at the question: "*Why can't we just make up a word to cover the emotion we want to express?*" The second question was roughly: "*If it had been possible to point to an emotion and name it, would that guarantee that others would understand the same by the word as I?*" Had it been possible to 'capture' the emotion in the baptismal process, then the listener/reader should supposedly grasp what the name was a name for. But, of course, language does not 'transfer' the essence of emotions into the heads of our listeners/readers. Such an idea might seem slightly more plausible when talking about concrete objects like 'horse', 'Rolls Royce', 'knife', etc. These objects can all be displayed on demand to a listener in a much more concrete way. The case with

⁸⁸ Ibid., 168.

emotions is not parallel, although crying or smiling does give us a good indication of at least what kind of emotion we are dealing with.

Wittgenstein expends a great deal of energy discussing the philosophical idea of ‘private objects’ in the sections known as the Private Language Argument. The idea is that the ‘privateness’ of things like emotions is the reason they cannot be communicated in the same way as physical objects. They cannot be displayed and pointed to in the same way. With ‘private objects’ there is a first person/third person asymmetry. ‘I’ have a first person *authority* when it comes to saying what ‘I’ feel.

The thesis that will be discussed in the following is that the reason for this asymmetry is not that objects are private but that it is the *grammar* of certain words that contain the asymmetry. The word we will concentrate on is “pain”.⁸⁹ A good starting point is Zettel §545:

Suppose someone explains how a child learns the use of the word “pain” in the following way: When the child behaves in such-and-such a way on particular occasions, I think he’s feeling what I feel in such cases; and it is so then the child associates the word with his feeling and uses the word when the feeling reappears. –*What* does this explanation explain? Ask yourself: *What* sort of ignorance does it remove? –Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct).⁹⁰

Wittgenstein is here not denying that we learn the word “pain” because our parents repeat it to us. The sound combination “p-a-i-n” would not appear out of nowhere by itself. The idea Wittgenstein is trying to dissolve is the idea that words stand for things, and that learning and language is learning what sounds stand for what. Wittgenstein is making a point about the word “pain” that is similar to the point Vygotsky makes in the quote

⁸⁹ Wittgenstein mostly talks of the sensation pain and not the emotion pain. Although there are differences between the two, they do not concern the asymmetry.

⁹⁰ A similar point is made in the §§302 and 315 of PI:

§302: “If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of one’s own, this is none too easy thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel.”

§ 315: “Could someone understand the word “pain” who had never felt pain? –Is experience to teach me whether this is so or not? –And if we say “A man could not imagine pain without having sometimes felt it” –how do we know? How can it be decided whether it is true?”

above about pointing. The far better conception of how we learn, not only what “pain” is the name for, but what pain *is*, is when we see that it is an *extension* of primitive behaviour. The word for pain was not invented by some genius who thought it would be useful to have a word to express “that type of uncomfortable sensation” with. The primitive pre-linguistic pain behaviour is *inseparable* from and prior to the word ‘pain’.

It is this often overlooked connection between the pre-linguistic and language that is Wittgenstein’s reason for bringing in the concept of grammar. By grammar Wittgenstein means something more than whether a word is a verb or a noun. Wittgenstein has something more than such a surface analysis in mind when he talks of the grammar of a word. For Wittgenstein talking about the grammar of a word is supposed to shed light on the relationship between the word itself and its connection with the pre-linguistic features of human life. Such features are not only pre-linguistic *behaviour*, but also how the human body works, the physical environment, the psychological environment, etc. In short everything that affects us as humans.

The concept of grammar is supposed to take into account the evolutionary history, so to speak, of a word. Knowing the information about a word that is listed in a dictionary is only part of the picture, and might even be misleading, if we believe that it lists all that it is necessary to know in order to understand a word. Describing the grammar of a word would be to give a long list of examples of when we can use the word, and what would be a non-primary use. We would have to stick primarily to giving examples because there cannot be given an exhaustive list of criteria for when to use a word, and when not to use it.

By painting a broad picture of the grammar of words like pain, the temptation to see pointing and naming as the essential feature of language, dwindles away. Since we cannot separate the word ‘pain’ from all the things we do while we are in pain, like gestures, wincing, crying out uncontrolled, etc., it is no longer so clear what was so obvious about the pointing and naming idea. At least that is what I take to be Wittgenstein’s point. Consequently the questions I suggested a philosophical layman might ask inspired by the example above from Erdogan’s novel, lose their force. The idea is no longer to explain how a name for an emotion can transmit information, but how the word ‘pain’ is an extension of the pre-linguistic expression of pain. In the pointing and naming picture of language it would seem like an incredibly lucky coincidence if I mean ‘the same’ as you

when we ‘exchange information’ about our emotional states. We need to put away the picture of words as entities that carry what I want to express over to my listeners, and replace it with a focus on the grammar of words.

The question we were looking at was : “*If it had been possible to point to an emotion and name it, would that guarantee that others would understand the same by the word as I?*”.

Whether “we mean the same by a word that names some emotion” is a problem that is heavily coloured by the idea that what words do is to *transmit* information. That understanding each other depends on whether our words point towards the same thing. This is of course true, and quite trivially true on a *surface* level. It is highly problematic if it is taken as being *the* mechanism behind language. Emotions, like for example pain, do not merely correspond with states and experiences but form an integral part of them. The word “ouch” cannot be separated from being in pain and analysed independently of the practices that make us act the way we do when we are in pain.

When Wittgenstein proposes that we do grammatical investigations of words, he wants us to “make a map” of how and when a word is used, so as to make ourselves aware of which practices the word in question is part of. A grammatical investigation of the word “pain” would be an investigation of when and which practices it is a part of. Such an investigations reveals that the first person/third person asymmetry of “pain” is a grammatical fact about the word and the practices it is a part of, and not a fact about the world.

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